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Abstract
The increasing urban population imposes a substantial and growing burden on the support-
ing infrastructure, such as electricity, water, heating, natural gas, road transportation, etc.
This paper presents a Hetero-functional graph theory (HFGT) based modeling framework for
these integrated infrastructures followed by an analysis of network robustness. The support-
ing infrastructures along with the infrastructure repair facilities are considered. In contrast to
conventional graph representations, a weighted HFGT model is used to capture the system pro-
cesses and mutual dependencies among resources. To assess robustness of the inter-dependent
networks, impacts of complete/partial and random/targeted attacks are quantified. Specifically,
various contingency scenarios are simulated and the vulnerability of the network is evaluated.
Additionally, several robustness metrics are proposed to provide a comprehensive evaluation
of system robustness. The proposed weighted HFGT modeling and robustness assessment ap-
proach is tested using a synthetic interdependent network, comprising of an electrical power
system, a water network, a district heating network, a natural gas system and a road trans-
portation network. Results demonstrate that system robustness can be enhanced via securing
system information and mitigating attack strength.
Keywords: Hetero-functional Graph Theory, Interdependent Urban Infrastructure,
Robustness, Contingency, Weighted dependency
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation and Background
The world population has increased by 113.3% [1] in the past 50 years. More importantly,
with massive urbanization, the percentage of global population in urban areas increased from
34% to 52% in the past five decades [2]. The swelling urban population imposes increasingly
intense demands over a variety of infrastructures. A large-scale urban area is comprised of
multiple utility networks that deliver a variety of services to the community, including electricity
[3], water [4], heating [5], natural gas [6], road transportation [7], etc. These networks are
inherently integrated and their interdependencies are becoming increasingly tight due to the
increased reliance on cyber infrastructure to enable smart and efficient operation.
The concepts of resilience and robustness have attracted tremendous attention in recent
years in response to the frequent and widespread natural disasters and man-made malicious
attacks across the globe. These extreme events impose significant threats to our urban in-
frastructures [8], [9], [10]. Several approaches have been proposed to model and evaluate the
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robustness of interdependent urban infrastructures such as hierarchical graph representation
[11], dynamic network flow model [12], agent based modeling [13], among others. This paper,
for the first time, proposes adopting a “weighted hetero-functional graph theory” concept [14]
to model and conduct robustness analysis of interdependent urban infrastructure networks,
comprising of electricity, water, heating, natural gas and road transportation networks (along
with infrastructure repair services).
1.2. Literature Review
The inter-dependencies of multiple infrastructures and services call for coordination of the
constituent systems. For instance, the increasing use of natural gas for electricity produc-
tion embodies inter-dependencies between natural gas and electric power infrastructures. Ac-
cordingly, many research works have been conducted to investigate the coordination and co-
optimization of the two systems. For instance, Zhao et al. carried out a series of research
works on coordinated planning [15] and operation [6] of integrated gas-electricity systems. It
was found that strategic coordination would aid in addressing several practical challenges in
natural gas systems, including natural gas leakage [16], rapid changes and significant uncertain-
ties in gas demand [15], and natural gas-supply bottlenecks [6], etc. Additionally, integrated
gas-electricity planning and operation is helpful in tackling the challenges frequently witnessed
in electric power systems, such as (1) the substantial gap between peaks and valleys of demand
profiles [17], (2) the inherently stochastic characteristics of renewable production [18], (3) the
poor performance of electricity demand prediction [19], etc. Furthermore, the unwillingness of
both natural gas and electricity system operators to share proprietary information is taken into
account in numerous studies. Accordingly, optimization frameworks for joint gas-electricity
operation with limited information exchanges are proposed to mitigate potential barriers of
coordinating the two systems [20].
Apart from gas-driven power plants that embody the integration between natural gas and
power networks, gas based combined heat and power (CHP) technology exploits gas engines
to generate electricity and useful heat simultaneously [21]. In the United States, the efficiency
of CHP applications is expected to reach 65% - 75%, which exhibits a significant improve-
ment over the national average of 50% efficiency if heating and electricity delivery services are
provided separately [22]. As a result, CHP technology allows for the tight integration of gas,
electricity and heating networks. To explore approaches to promote such integration, [21] pro-
posed stochastic optimal operation of a low-carbon micro integrated electric power, natural gas
and heating delivery systems, centered around CHP facilities. [23] proposed a novel framework
for modeling flexibility of integrated gas, electricity and heating network with gas-driven CHP
technology. A unified steady-state energy flow analysis considering electrical, natural gas and
heating networks with gas-driven CHP facilities as the coupling points was presented in [24].
Excluding the electrical sector, heating and cooling sector alone accounts for a large portion of
the energy consumption portfolio (with 50% of European Union’s annual energy consumption
in 2019) [25]. Further, in the European Union, the largest energy source for heating and cool-
ing is natural gas with 46% share [25]. In addition to the CHP technology mentioned earlier,
natural gas powered heating/cooling plants serve as an alternative source for district heating
networks (DHN) [26]. As a consequence, co-optimization of integrated gas-electricity-heating
networks incorporating power plants, heating plants and CHP facilities, which are all driven
by natural gas, has been studied in prior literature, such as [27], [28].
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Electricity infrastructures and water distribution system (WDS) facilities are also tightly
integrated. In the United States, WDS facilities, including water plants and water pipelines, are
energy intensive infrastructures that account for 3% - 4% of the total electricity consumption
[4]. Multiple prior publications have discussed the inter-dependency and proposed the schemes
to coordinate these two infrastructures [29]. For instance, [4] proposed a network-constrained
unit commitment model for electric power systems, considering flexibility of electricity usage for
WDS. [29] applied a Bayesian network to estimate the service disruptions of integrated power
and water supply system after an earthquake. This analysis provides insights into the resilience
of electricity-water network infrastructures. [30] suggested the use of private-owned microgrids
and water pumps for enhancing accessibility to water and power after natural disasters. Aside
from power lines and pipelines that interconnect electricity, heating, gas and water facilities,
road transportation systems act as an indispensable sector that delivers a variety of materials,
services and merchandise to those infrastructures. Incorporating the geographical information
and traffic conditions into energy system operation has been discussed in [31].
In this paper, for the first time, interdependent urban infrastructure networks (IUNs) in-
cluding electricity, natural gas, heating, water and road transportation for repair service are
modeled under a common framework. A weighted hetero-functional graph theory (HFGT) [14]
is used as the modeling framework within which robustness assessment is conducted. HFGT
can be viewed as an intellectual fusion of model-based systems engineering and network science,
and has been applied in transportation networks [32], production systems [33], power grids [34],
among others. Along with capturing physical dependency, it also models a functional relation-
ship. Specifically, seven models can be used to study network component dependency, including
(1) system concept, (2) hetero-functional adjacency matrix, (3) controller agency matrix, (4)
controller adjacency matrix, (5) service as operand behavior, (6) service feasibility matrix, and
(7) system adjacency matrix. In this paper, we focus on the system concept model. Com-
pared to conventional multi-layer graphs [35], the system concept model provides structural
descriptions of a system that indicates the mapping of system resources to system function-
alities (processes). Similarly, the process relation model has been proposed which relates the
dependency among various processes. For example, in a power system network, the graphical
nodes and edges in the process relation model represent the processes and dependencies between
processes, instead of buses and power lines [36]. The process relation model can therefore re-
veal in-depth information about system configurations and capabilities. Further, various attack
simulations can be conducted on the process relation graphical model to evaluate robustness.
It is worth to note that the “attack” word used throughout this paper, represents contingencies
(complete or partial loss of nodes) in the network that can be caused by both malicious attacks
and natural disasters.
1.3. Contributions
The major contributions of this paper are listed below.
• This paper, for the first time, introduces a weighted Hetero-functional graph theory based
approach to model urban interdependent infrastructure networks. Unlike [14], which
merely presents a visual representation, this paper conducts an in-depth analysis that
reveals system robustness against contingencies from multiple dimensions.
• System network configuration information is further incorporated into Hetero-functional
graph development. Specifically, the dependencies and interconnections among various
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processes due to network constraints are modeled in detail, enhancing the practical ap-
plicability of this work.
• A comprehensive evaluation of the robustness of weighted IUN is presented for the first
time. Four types of attacks with various strengths and knowledge levels are modeled and
simulated. These attacks include (1) complete random attacks; (2) complete targeted
attacks; (3) partial random attacks; and (4) partial targeted attacks. In other words,
instead of simply presuming a process will be entirely disabled after an attack, we cover
a variety of real-world attack scenarios that might only lead to partial degradation of the
associated process until it becomes completely dysfunctional. Therefore, the proposed
assessment strategy would provide realistic and inclusive suggestions for decision makers
to optimize the dependency relations among infrastructures for robustness enhancement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of con-
ventional and HFGT models with proposed weighted HFGT framework. Section 3 discusses
robustness evaluation and various attack strategies. In Section 4, numerical results are pre-
sented along with the comparison across attack strategies. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2. Modeling Integrated Urban Networks
This section presents existing paradigms for modeling IUN, followed by an overview of the
proposed framework. Specifically, the system knowledge base of HFGT that maps the allocation
of system resources to system processes will be depicted and elaborated here.
2.1. Conventional Graph Theory framework
A conceptual diagram for an IUN is depicted in Fig. 1, which is used as an example
to illustrate the interactions among infrastructures. In this directed graph representation,
the nodes denote various infrastructures and facilities, while directed edges represent the en-
ergy/water/service flow among the nodes. As seen, networks of electricity, natural gas, heating,
and water are intertwined to support each other. For instance, the operative gas-driven power
plant (PP1) depends on the gas supply from the gas source (GS) and water supply from the wa-
ter treatment plant (WTP). Besides, the effective maintenance and repair service for PP1 relies
on the power infrastructure repair facility (RP). On the other hand, PP1 provides electricity
to other infrastructures and facilities, such as GS, WTP, among others. Additionally, customer
demands (CD) for energy and water supplies are supported by the corresponding facilities.
2.2. Hetero-functional Graph Theory (HFGT) framework
Although the conventional graph representation can reveal the topological information and
fundamental relationship among system components, for complex systems, it does not provide
in-depth knowledge about system processes and mutual dependencies among resources. In other
words, questions such as “What are the dependencies of a particular facility on the others?”,
“What processes are performed within nodes and edges?”, “How important are nodes and edges
for system performance?” cannot be properly addressed by analyzing conventional graph rep-
resentations. Therefore, Farid et al. [14] introduced an HFGT framework to rigorously model
IUN and tackle all the challenges unaddressed within the conventional graph theory paradigm.
The skeleton of HFGT consists of seven building blocks starting with the system concept model
that maps system processes to system resources. System process is defined as an activity that
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Figure 1: Conventional Graph Representation of a Conceptual Interdependent Urban Infrastructure Network
(IUN)
transforms a predefined set of inputs into a predefined set of outputs, e.g. generating electricity
from a PP, producing treated water from a WTP, etc. System resource is a physical entity
which executes the processes, such as PP, WTP, GS, etc. The system concept model provides
a rigorous platform to conduct this transformation. Specifically, the system knowledge matrix
(JS) in the system concept model is a binary matrix, which maps the processes (P ) with the
corresponding resources (R) as follows:
P = JS R (1)
where  is matrix boolean multiplication [37]. The element in the JS that projects the element
in R to the corresponding element in P is equal to unity, when an action that converts the
resource to the process exists. For instance, a power plant, as a system resource, can be mapped
to generating electricity, as a system process, via the knowledge matrix (JS). Accordingly, the
particular element in JS representing the electricity generation action being executed by the
power plant is set to unity.
2.3. Weighted hetero functional graph theory (WHFGT) framework
Using the knowledge matrix, system resources and system processes can be mapped. To
more realistically capture process interactions, we propose a process relation matrix (PR), which
is developed on top of the conventional dependency matrix of HFGTs. For the conventional
dependency matrix, the relationships between the processes are expressed in binary terms, i.e.,
it only captures whether the dependency is present or not. However, it is inadequate to quantify
the degree of dependency between the two processes. Therefore, to address this shortcoming, we
propose a weighted HFGT (WHFGT) framework and the corresponding relation matrix (PR),
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which quantifies the degree of dependency using real valued weight. For a particular node in the
WHFGT, the weights of its associated edges in matrix PR denote the degree of dependencies
on other processes. For instance, in Fig. 1, electricity demand of the community customers can
be supplied by two sources, i.e., the gas-driven power plant and CHP, and the dependencies
on both of them can be reflected by assigning weights. The process relation matrix (PR) for
the conceptual diagram shown in Fig. 1 is shown in [38], which is a 43 × 43 matrix as 43
processes are incorporated. Correspondingly, Fig. 2 depicts the process relation graph for a
synthetic network shown in Fig. 1. The direction of edges are from the source to target nodes,
where target nodes (processes) are dependent on the source nodes (processes) with dependency
proportional to the edge weights. In the following sections, extensive analysis will be conducted
on the process relation graph to evaluate robustness of IUN. The WHFGT allows one to study
the interdependency in a more informative way in a sense that the dependency weights could
play an important role in various graph robustness analysis (percolation, cascading failures,
etc.).
Figure 2: Process relation graph corresponding to the network shown in Fig. 1
3. Contingency Analysis in WHFGT Framework
The tight interconnections among various infrastructures may exacerbate the impact of
potential cascading failures, as contingencies in one part of the system might propagate to
other networks. Therefore, assessment of robustness for interdependent urban networks is
critical for vulnerability analysis and robustness enhancement.
To simulate contingencies on IUNs, the nodes are defined as the targets for attacks. In
other words, disabling certain processes is equivalent to removing the associated nodes in the
WHFGT graphs. Besides, based on graph percolation procedure [39], nodes are removed in
stages and the robustness metrics of the residual graph are computed at each stage to study the
transition properties of the graph. Along with the removal of a selected node, the child nodes
of the selected node are also removed under specific conditions. Here, child nodes are defined as
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nodes that can be reached (directed path exist) from the selected node and are computed using
depth first search algorithm [40]. We would like to reiterate that, for the sake of simplicity, all
the contingencies in this paper are referred to as “attacks”.
According to the available system information and attacker capabilities/strength, the at-
tacks can be further divided into four categories, as tabulated in Table 1. Random/targeted
attacks are categorized based on the knowledge level of attackers about the system. Specifically,
in a random attack, nodes are removed randomly at each stage of the percolation whereas, in a
targeted attack, nodes are removed based on certain importance scores of nodes (assuming the
system information is available to the attacker). On the other hand, complete/partial attacks
are categorized based on attackers capability. Specifically, in a complete attack, the attacker
disables a process completely, while in a partial attack, the attack can only degrade the process
to a certain degree. Detailed description of these attack categories will be provided later.
3.1. Graph Centrality
As mentioned earlier, targeted attacks are launched based on the importance scores as-
signed to nodes, assuming the attacker has acquired the entire system information. Here, the
concept of centrality is applied to quantify importance of nodes in a network. Four types of
centrality are widely applied in prior literature, including degree centrality, eigenvector cen-
trality, pagerank centrality and betweenness centrality [41]. The degree centrality indicates
the number of connected edges for each node. The intuitive interpretation of degree is that
nodes with more connections imply involvement in more functionalities and transformations.
Moreover, for directed graphs, degree centrality can be separated into in-degree and out-degree,
which represent the number of incoming edges and outgoing edges, respectively. Thus, weighted
out-degree denotes the total sum of outgoing edge weights. Eigenvector centrality provides an
alternative perspective of the node’s importance. Here, the focus is on quantifying the influence
of connected nodes, instead of using the number of connected nodes. A potential problem faced
by eigenvector centrality is that if one node is among a large number of nodes connected to
another node with substantially high centrality, the eigenvector centrality index would over-
estimate the influence of that particular node. PageRank centrality is proven to be able to
resolve this issue and is one of the most well-known and frequently used measure in search
engines [42]. Finally, the betweenness centrality measures the extent to which a node lies on
the shortest paths between other nodes. Nodes with high betweenness are expected to have
considerable influence within a network by virtue of their control over information passing be-
tween others. In IUN, we select betweenness and weighted out-degree centrality as the basis to
conduct targeted attacks. Specifically, removal of nodes with high betweenness centrality and
high weighted out-degree centrality in the earlier stages is considered as efficient approaches
to impair the system connectivity, thereby simulating extreme conditions. While betweenness
centrality and out-degree centrality are selected as an example to implement targeted attacks
in this paper, the study can be extended to other guiding metrics as well.
3.2. Complete attack
The most trivial type of attack scenario would be the situation where the attacker is capable
of disabling a process completely, referred to as a complete attack. This can be caused by
extreme natural events or powerful malicious attackers. In WHFGT, complete attacks can
be represented by removal of corresponding nodes entirely, within a single stage. Based on
the knowledge level of the attacker, complete attacks can be further categorized into complete
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Table 1: Types of attack strategies
```````````````Strength
Information
Random Target
Complete complete random complete target
Partial partial random partial target
random and complete targeted attacks. Specifically, for a complete random attack, it is assumed
that the attacker is not aware of the internal configuration of the IUN and hence the targeted
nodes (processes) will be attacked randomly. Under this situation, nodes are selected randomly
for removal at each stage of the percolation and the percolation is continued until the graph is
left with two nodes. Obviously, if a child node (process) is dependent on its only parent node
(process), disabling the parent node (process) will lead to obliteration of the child node. For
instance, “ the node representing the process of transport water from WTP to the residential
community” will be removed once the node corresponding to the process of “treat water in
WTP” is out of the graph. On the other hand, for child nodes with multiple parent nodes,
removing some (not all) of its parent nodes will lead to a certain degree of degradation, which
is quantified by the out-degree weight reduction. Out-degree weights of a node indicate the
amount of dependency the neighbors have on the node, whereas the in-degree weights of a
node signify the extent of dependency the node has on its neighbor. Specifically, the decrease
of out-degree weights is assumed to be in proportion to the decrease of in-degree weights. In
other words, for a particular node (process), with less inputs from parent nodes (processes),
its performance of supporting other nodes (processes) will be degraded accordingly. When the
out-degree weight of a node decreases to a pre-defined threshold, namely critical quality of
functionality (QoF), it will be removed from the graph. The practical interpretation of this
rule is that when a process is unable to support certain follow-up services, it will be considered
as dysfunctional. For instance, when the process of “deliver electricity to customers 1-5” is
degraded to “deliver electricity to only customer 1” due to attacks, the relevant infrastructure
might be considered as dysfunctional and the temporary shutdown & maintenance actions may
be needed. Note that the critical QoF value can be assigned flexibly, based on the specific
processes and situations.
Furthermore, considering the frequent occurrences of malicious cyber attacks around the
globe, it is increasingly vital to address the situation wherein the attacker could obtain insights
on the entire system and launch targeted attacks. Targeted attacks aim to remove nodes with
higher weighted out-degree/betweenness centrality in the earlier stages of percolation. In other
words, processes with higher importance are targeted in the earlier stages of percolation. The
complete targeted attack is similar to its random counterpart except that the nodes are selected
on the basis of predefined importance score, determined by weighted out-degree/betweenness
centrality. During targeted attacks, nodes are removed in descending order of importance.
The detailed procedure of complete attack is shown in Algorithm 1. The robustness metrics
indicated in the output of Algorithm 1 will be elaborated in section 4. Again, it should be noted
that the word “attack” used in this paper does not necessarily denote malicious cyber/physical
destruction, but also represents natural disasters that may lead to serious damage.
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Algorithm 1 Complete attack
Input: Graph G with V nodes.
Output: List of robustness metrics corresponding to various percolation stages
LOOP Process
1: while |V | > 2 do
2: nodeselected : Select a node randomly or based on the order of important scores.
3: childnodes : Find all child nodes of nodeselected.
4: remove nodeselected from G
5: for child in childnodes do
6: indeg : Find weighted in degree of child node
7: outdeg : Find weighted out degree of child node
8: Degradationratio= current indeg of child
indeg of child before percolation
9: outdegweights : Decrease the out edges weight of child by Degradationratio
10: if ( indeg= 0) or (outdegweights < Quality of Function) then
11: remove child from G
12: end if
13: end for
14: compute robustness metrics
15: end while
16: return list of robustness metrics corresponding to various percolation stages
3.3. Partial attack
The complete attack is designed for simulating the scenarios where the attack is sufficiently
powerful to destroy a process completely, which results in loss of the entire process. To examine
the robustness of the graph against less severe contingencies, we propose a new type of attack
strategy referred to as partial attack. The key difference between partial and complete attack
strategies is that during percolation of a partial attack, the attacked nodes will only experience
out-degree depletion until the critical QoF value is violated. In other words, unlike complete
attacks where the attacked process is disabled unconditionally, partial attacks will only lead
to a certain level of degradation. Without loss of generality, the degradation level is set to
20% in this paper, which can be adapted to other levels based on specific conditions. On the
other hand, similar to complete attacks, partial attacks can be further subdivided into two
types depending upon the knowledge level of the attacker, namely partial random attacks and
partial targeted attacks. For partial random attacks, the attacked nodes are selected randomly,
while nodes with higher weighted out-degree/betweenness centrality will be targeted in the
early stages during partial targeted attacks. Algorithm 2 describes the complete procedure of
a partial attack. It should be noted that partial attack analysis only applies to our proposed
weighted hetero functional graphs, since partial degradation of weights can be incorporated.
Traditional HFGT framework cannot accommodate these realistic attack scenarios.
4. Numerical Study
In this section, we implement weighted Hetero-functional graph theory based modeling of
IUN and evaluate its robustness. To begin with, the system network configuration is described,
along with its effects on the process relation matrix (PR). After introducing several robustness
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Algorithm 2 Partial attack
Input: Graph G with V nodes.
Output: List of robustness metrics corresponding to various percolation stages
LOOP Process
1: while |V | > 2 do
2: nodeselected : Select a node randomly or based on the order of important scores.
3: childnodes : Find all child nodes of nodeselected.
4: outdegweights : Decrease the out edges weight of nodeselected by random quantity.
5: if ( outdegweights < Acceptable service) then
6: remove nodeselected from G
7: end if
8: for child in childnodes do
9: indeg : Find weighted in degree of child node
10: outdeg : Find weighted out degree of child node
11: Degradationratio= current indeg of child
indeg of child before percolation
12: outdegweights : Decrease the out edges weight of child by Degradationratio
13: if ( indeg= 0) or (outdegweights < Quality of Function) then
14: remove child from G
15: end if
16: end for
17: compute robustness metrics
18: end while
19: return list of robustness metrics corresponding to various percolation stages
metrics, the IUN robustness is quantified by analyzing the impacts of four types of attack
scenarios. Finally, the application of proposed robustness assessment method in optimizing
dependency relations among infrastructures for robustness enhancement is demonstrated.
4.1. System Network Configuration
Fig. 3 shows the integrated urban network of interest. This network comprises of an elec-
tric power system [43], a gas network [44], a water system [45], a road transportation network
[46], and a district heating network [47]. Further, Table 2 tabulates the locations of various
infrastructure facilities within the networks, including 1 gas-fired power plant (GPP), 1 solar
power plant (SPP), 2 water treatment plants (WTP), 3 heating plants (HPL), 2 gas stations
(GS), 1 gas-driven CHP, 2 industry parks (IP1-IP2), 3 commercial zones (CZ1-CZ3), 6 resi-
dential zones (RZ1-RZ6), 1 water infrastructure repair facility (WIRF), 1 power infrastructure
repair facility (PIRF) and 1 natural gas infrastructure repair facility (GIRF). To ensure the
proper operation of these facilities, 121 processes are required in total. In particular, electricity
supplies of industry parks, commercial zones and one residential zone (RZ1) depend on three
electric power sources, including the gas-driven power plant, CHP and the solar plant. The
complete process relation matrix is presented in [38].
For this system network configuration, the relation matrix needs to be extended to incor-
porate the additional dependencies among processes due to the shared path of energy/service
deliveries. For instance, the successful execution of the process that transmits power from GPP
(located at node 5 in electric power network) to WIRF (located at node 1 in electric power net-
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Figure 3: Standard test networks corresponding to power, water, transport, gas and heating networks
work) depends on the successful execution of process that transmits power from GPP (located
at node 5 in electric power network) to WTP1 (located at node 2 in electric power network).
This is because, the electricity delivery path between GPP (node 5) and WTP1 (node 2) is
a part of the only path for electricity transmission from GPP (node 5) to WIRF (node 1).
Similarly, the effects of other network constraints on process dependencies are integrated into
the process relation matrix.
4.2. Metrics for robustness evaluation
Robustness of IUN in the present work is studied through the percolation process, where
nodes of the network are removed in stages and the connectivity of the residual network is
assessed at each stage, until the graph is completely disconnected. In a high level definition,
the connectivity of the residual graph after node removal represents the robustness of the
graph towards that node attack. In general, higher connectivity of the residual graph indicates
enhanced robustness. The conventional indices for quantification of graph connectivity include
Largest Connected Component (LCC) and the Number of Connected Components (NCC) [48].
Here, a component denotes a subgraph, in which any two vertices are connected to each other
by paths and is connected to no additional vertices in the graph. Specifically, LCC denotes
the size of the largest component where every node is at least connected to one other node,
while NCC represents the number of connected components in the entire graph. Furthermore,
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Table 2: Locations of Entities in Various Networks
```````````````Utility
Description
Entity Location Entity Location Entity Location
WIRF Node 1 CZ1 Node 9 RZ2 Node 17
WTP1 Node 3 WTP2 Node 11 RZ3 Node 19
IP1 Node 4 CZ2 Node 12 RZ4 Node 20
Power GPP Node 5 RZ1 Node 13 GS2 Node 21
IP2 Node 6 GIRF Node 14 RZ5 Node 22
GS1 Node 7 SPP Node 15 CHP1 Node 23
PIRF Node 8 CZ3 Node 16 RZ6 Node 24
WIRF Node 1 CZ1 Node 9 RZ2 Node 17
HPL1 Node 2 HPL2 Node 10 HPL3 Node 18
WTP1 Node 3 WTP2 Node 11 RZ3 Node 19
Water IP1 Node 4 CZ2 Node 12 RZ4 Node 20
GPP Node 5 RZ1 Node 13 GS2 Node 21
IP2 Node 6 GIRF Node 14 RZ5 Node 22
GS1 Node 7 SPP Node 15 RZ6 Node 24
PIRF Node 8 CZ3 Node 16
GS1 Node 1 HPL3 Node 8 RZ3 Node 14
HPL1 Node 2 CHP1 Node 10 RZ4 Node 15
Gas GPP Node 5 RZ1 Node 12 RZ5 Node 17
HPL2 Node 6 RZ2 Node 13 RZ6 Node 19
WIRF Node 1 CZ2 Node 12 RZ3 Node 19
IP1 Node 4 RZ1 Node 13 RZ4 Node 20
Heat IP2 Node 6 GIRF Node 14 RZ5 Node 22
PIRF Node 8 CZ3 Node 16 CHP1 Node 23
CZ1 Node 9 RZ2 Node 17 RZ6 Node 24
WIRF Node 1 PIRF Node 8 HPL3 Node 18
HPL1 Node 2 HPL2 Node 10 GS2 Node 21
Transport WTP1 Node 3 WTP2 Node 11 CHP1 Node 23
GPP Node 5 GIRF Node 14
GS1 Node 7 SPP Node 15
we use flow robustness (FR) to quantify robustness, from the components standpoint [49]. It
captures the ability of the nodes to communicate with each other in all the clusters and hence
characterizes the overall reachability of the graph. Unlike LCC that only accounts for the
largest connected component, FR incorporates the number of nodes in all components of the
residual graph. The FR metric corresponds to:
FR =
∑
i |Ci|(|Ci| − 1)
N(N − 1) (2)
where Ci is the number of nodes in component i and N denotes the total number of nodes in
the original graph before attacks. As seen, FR represents the degradation at a global level by
monitoring the connectivity situation of all components and hence reveals global robustness.
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However, the three indices described earlier are inherently incapable of incorporating weights
of edges. Therefore, a new index, namely Service robustness (SR), that leverages the weights
of edges is designed as:
SR =
∑
iQ
a
i∑
iQi
(3)
where Qai denotes the weighted out-degree of node i after each stage of attack and Qi represents
the total weighted out-degree of all nodes in the original graph without attacks. The SR index
not only infers connectivity of the graph, but also incorporates the weights of edges. Since
the weights of edges quantify the dependencies between source and target nodes, integrating
them into the robustness analysis would aid in providing a more precise evaluation of impacts
of attacks.
To summarize, it is obvious that higher values of LCC, FR and SR indicate a more robust
network, as they quantify reachability and connectivity from various dimensions. However,
the relationship between the NCC and robustness is not straightforward. Specifically, at the
initial stages of decomposition process of the graph, the value of NCC may increase since the
entire graph is decomposed into several sub-graphs (components). After a certain stage, the
value of NCC decreases gradually, as components start to vanish into individual nodes. In the
next sub-section, we examine the robustness of the graph described earlier by observing the
trajectories of the four robustness metrics along the percolation stages with different types of
attacks.
4.3. IUN Robustness Analysis
The robustness of IUN is examined by evaluating the robustness metrics, i.e., LCC, NCC,
SR and FR, after each stage of percolation. The impacts of four attack strategies, i.e., complete
random attack, complete targeted attack, partial random attack and partial targeted attack,
are examined and compared in the following. The attacked node selections in targeted attack
are carried out based on betweenness and weighted out-degree. Additionally, Monte-Carlo sim-
ulation approach is used here to evaluate the effects of random attack strategies on robustness
metrics. Here, the random selections of attacked nodes are repeated 10,000 times.
4.3.1. Complete attack
As mentioned earlier, in a complete attack, the attacked nodes are removed completely
once the attack is imposed. The trajectories of the four robustness metrics are depicted in
Fig. 4. As expected, LCC decreases along with the progress of percolation, as node removals
will decompose the graph into various components with a smaller number of nodes. On the
other hand, the NCC increases in the initial stages and starts declining after a certain stage.
This is because, initially, the entire graph is fragmented into several sub-graphs that lead to an
increasing number of connected components. After a certain stage (stage 14 in this case), those
sub-graphs will be further decomposed into individual nodes, decreasing the value of NCC. The
global metric FR also drops exponentially but with a lower decay rate compared to LCC, which
implies the slower degradation of connectivity (weighted or unweighted) among various com-
ponents across the entire graph (compared to the local connectivity in the largest component).
The trajectory of SR shows a gradual decline as well, which captures the diminishing mutual
dependencies among nodes.
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To demonstrate the effects of attackers’ knowledge about the system, we further illustrate
the trajectories of robustness metrics with imposed betweenness- and weighted outdegree-based
targeted attacks along the percolation stages, as depicted by blue and green curves in Fig. 4,
respectively. Like the results associated with complete random attacks, the general patterns of
trajectories of robustness metrics correspond to the trend of gradual decline except for NCC.
The NCC metric initially increases abruptly followed by fluctuations and eventually settles in
the final stages. Additionally, the value of FR has a lower decay rate compared to LCC value,
which indicates a certain level of connectivity among components even with few nodes in the
largest component. Additionally, compared to a random attack, the degradation of the system
robustness is substantially higher with targeted attacks. Specifically, it takes 12 and 10 stages to
disconnect the graph entirely if betweenness and weighted out-degree are selected as the basis to
launch targeted attacks, compared to an average of 40 stages required to completely disconnect
the graph with imposed random attacks. To further quantify the distinctions between random
and targeted attacks, the numbers of sequential attacks required for degrading the robustness
metrics to certain levels are tabulated in Table 3. The results illustrate that targeted attacks
require fewer steps to reach the same level of degradation as random attacks. For instance,
achieving 50% degradation in FR only takes 3 and 1 stages for betweenness- and weighted
outdegree-based targeted attacks, respectively, while 10 steps are needed to attain the same
level of degradation with random attacks. In other words, this test demonstrates the value of
securing system information, as attackers with system information are capable of causing severe
destruction rapidly. Furthermore, comparing two types of targeted attacks, we can observe that
the weighted outdegree-based targeted attacks outperform betweenness-based targeted attacks
for all robustness metrics. This implies that weighted outdegree centrality could provide a more
precise indication of nodes importance in this test.
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Figure 4: Trajectory of robustness metrics across various stages of percolation with complete attack
4.3.2. Partial attack
In partial random attacks, attacked nodes are selected randomly with a certain level of
degradation at each stage of percolation. The orange curves in Fig. 5 depict the trajectories
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Table 3: Number of attacks for various degradation level corresponding to random and targeted
attacks with complete attack strategy RN: Random attack BW: Betweenness based targeted
attack OD: Out-degree based targeted attack
Degradation Level 20% 50% 80%
XXXXXXXXXXXXMetric
Attack
RN BW OD RN BW OD RN BW OD
LCC 3 1 1 7 1 1 15 3 2
FR 4 1 1 10 3 1 22 3 2
SR 3 1 1 8 2 1 17 3 2
of robustness metrics. The general trends in Fig. 5 are similar to the results of a complete
random attack. Specifically, the metrics of LCC, FR and SR decrease abruptly at the beginning
followed by a moderate decline, while the index of NCC increases initially and decreases after
a certain stage. These observations are consistent with the results from complete attack case
described earlier.
We also illustrate the trajectories of robustness metrics along the percolation stages with
partial targeted attacks, as depicted in blue and green curves in Fig. 5. As seen in the figure,
targeted attacks lead to a more abrupt decrease in LCC, FR and SR. To further illustrate
the graph fragmentation process, Fig. 6 depicts the histograms of number of nodes in each
component at representative stages of partial targeted attack. The rapid decrease of node
number in each component at the beginning can be explicitly observed, while the component
decomposition process significantly slows down after stage 10. The results correspond to the
conclusion drawn from Fig. 5, which again signifies the remarkable ability of targeted attacks
in decimating the network rapidly. Additionally, the notable gap between partial random and
targeted attack strategies can be observed in Table 4, which tabulates the required numbers of
attack stages to reach certain degradation levels. As expected, it takes fewer steps for targeted
attacks to fragment the graph into a certain level. In a nutshell, the general trend of robustness
metrics are similar in both complete and partial attacks. The distinction between complete
and partial attacks is compared with the distinction between targeted and random attacks in
the following subsection.
Table 4: Number of attacks for various degradation level corresponding to random and targeted
attacks with partial attack strategy. RN: Random attack BW: Betweenness based targeted
attack OD: Out-degree based targeted attack
Degradation Level 20% 50% 80%
XXXXXXXXXXXXMetric
Attack
RN BW OD RN BW OD RN BW OD
LCC 4 1 1 11 4 1 23 6 4
FR 4 1 1 13 6 1 30 6 4
SR 5 1 1 13 4 1 26 6 4
4.3.3. Complete random attack versus partial targeted attack
Evidently, complete, targeted attacks cause more severe damage than partial, random at-
tacks, as demonstrated in Tables 3 and 4. In this section, the comparison between the impacts
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attack
of a complete random attack and a partial targeted attack is conducted to evaluate the merits
of securing system information and infrastructure hardening.
To begin with, from Tables 3 and 4, we can observe that the distinction between random and
targeted attacks is more significant, compared to the distinction between complete and partial
attacks. For instance, the gaps between a partial random attack and a complete random attack,
along with a partial targeted attack and a complete targeted attack in term of the required
stages to cause 80% degradation in FR are 8 and 2 stages, respectively. Whereas, the gaps
between a partial random attack and a partial targeted attack, along with a complete random
attack and a complete targeted attack for the same goal are 26 and 20 stages, respectively.
To further illustrate and demonstrate which factor dominates severity of attacks, strength or
intelligence, Fig. 7 depicts snapshots of the residual graph at three representative stages with
a complete random attack and a partial targeted attack. It can be observed that the partial
targeted attack outperforms the complete random attack in rate of node eliminations. This
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study reinforces the merits of securing system information for robustness enhancement.
Stage-2 Stage-5 Stage-12
A: Complete random attack 
B: Partial targeted attack 
Figure 7: Snapshots of graph across representative stages of percolation with complete random attack and
partial targeted attack.
4.4. WHFGT based Optimal Dependency allocation
Apart from identifying influential processes and evaluating robustness, the proposed frame-
work can aid in deriving the optimal dependency between processes across infrastructures that
would result in enhanced robustness. The optimal dependency (weight) allocation strategy
resulting in the optimized robustness metrics can be obtained by solving an optimization prob-
lem. For example, the objective could be to maximize the number of stages needed to degrade a
selected robustness index by 80% (as a higher number of stages implies higher robustness). Par-
ticularly, the nodes (processes) that have multiple inputs, i.e., processes that depend on various
other nodes, are the candidate nodes for this optimization problem with the weights of their
incoming edges as the variables that need to be optimized. Further, the sum of the incoming
edge weights for any node must be equal to one. For example, We assume that weights can only
be selected from the set of {0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0}. Enumeration-based
method is applied to obtain the optimal solution of this NP-hard problem with the objective of
maximizing the required steps to degrade SR to a certain level, considering complete targeted
attacks as an example. This approach can be extended to other robustness metrics and attack
strategies as well. The detailed procedure is illustrated in Fig. 8, where weights of edges are
selected randomly from a finite set, while ensuring that the sum of the incoming weights for
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Figure 8: Flowchart depicting the enumeration
each candidate node (nodes with multiple dependency) equates to one. Then, complete tar-
geted attack is simulated to track the number of attacks desired for 80% degradation of the
selected robustness index and this process is repeated for multiple times with different edge
weight combination. Finally, the weight combination which embodies the highest robustness is
the desired solution. In this case, for node 3 which represents the process “Water treatment
facility WTP1 is working properly”, the obtained optimal dependency weights are 0.3 and 0.7
for node 35 (“Transit power from GPP to WTP1”) and node 36 (“Transit power from SPP to
WTP1”), respectively. Compared to the approach based on random assignments of weights,
we can observe a 12% reduction of stages required to degrade SR by 80%. Developing more
efficient analytical formulations along with effective algorithms to solve them will form a path
of our future direction.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents, for the first time, a weighted Hetero functional graph theory based
framework for modeling and resilience assessment of urban integrated infrastructure networks,
including electricity, water, district heating, natural gas, road transportation networks and rel-
evant services. Specifically, system processes are denoted by nodes and edges represent the
dependencies among various processes. We conduct various types of attack simulations on the
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proposed weighted Hetero functional graphs and provide in-depth information about the trajec-
tories of graph fragments. In particular, to simulate real-word scenarios, four attack scenarios,
namely complete random attack, complete targeted attack, partial random attack and partial
targeted attack, are implemented on the network and the resulting vulnerability is analyzed
via plotting the trajectories of several robustness metrics. The outcomes of robustness analysis
are used to determine the optimal dependencies for robustness enhancement. Key conclusions
include: (1) complete attacks cause more damage compared to partial attacks, highlighting the
need for infrastructure hardening; (2) exposing network information to attackers is likely to
incur substantially more serious consequences, as targeted attacks are able to decimate graph
connectivity rapidly; (3) partial targeted attack causes higher damage than the complete ran-
dom attack, which indicates that securing system information is more crucial than physical
hardening; (4) proper dependency (weight) allocation strategy across processes would further
aid in enhancing the system robustness.
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